COMPUTER PROGRAMS ARE PATENTABLE*
A computer' is a machine that is capable of performing arithmetic
and logical operations on data presented to it in an appropriate form.
The operation of the apparatus, termed the hardware,2 comprising a
digital computer depends upon the use of a computer program, termed
the software.8 While both hardware and software are currently of great
economic importance,4 the anticipated growth of the development of
software5 has generated much discussion as to whether proprietary interests in this form of property could best be protected by the patent
system 7 or by some other means. However, in spite of all the discussion,
This Comment is directed toward the patent practitioner. Brief explanations of
technical terms and words of art unique to the practice of patent law have been included
in the footnotes for the benefit of readers outside of the patent field.
1 There are two basic types of computers, analog and digital. Analog computers
operate on numerical quantities by representing them by some kind of continuous measure,
such as a voltage, whose magnitude is determined by the magnitude of the numerical
quantity. Digital computers operate on numerical quantities having the form of digits
represented by discrete electrical signals. Only digital computers are of interest in this
Comment.
2 The hardware comprising a digital computer is generally considered to comprise
five distinct units: (1) an arithmetic unit for performing addition, subtraction and
similar operations; (2) a memory unit for storing data; (3) input equipment for placing
data in the memory unit; (4) output equipment for retrieving data from the memory
unit; and (5) a control unit for providing the proper time sequence operation of the
other units. See P. SHERMAN, PROGRAMMING AND CODING DIGITAL COMPUTERS 42 (1963).
3 Unfortunately, the terms "computer program" and "software" are commonly used
to designate a great variety of distinct things. The following definition will be used
herein: A computer program is a set of steps that serve to specify changes in the state
of the component parts of a digital computer.
4 Bradburn, Where Is The Computer Industry Heading?, COMPUTERS AND ATrroMATION, Jan., 1970, at 10. The world-wide total of U.S. computer systems [including both
hardware and software] has reached 70,000, valued at $24 billion. The comparable figures
one year ago were 57,000 systems worth $17 billion.
5 It is expected that $1.5 billion will be spent on software in 1970. This figure is
expected to grow to $2.6 billion in 1975. COMPUTER DECISIONS, Jan. 1970, at 2.
8 This concern has been expressed in a plethora of articles concerning the best means
of protecting computer programs. For an excellent compilation of citations to these
articles see Comment, Computer Programs: Should They Be Patentable?, 68 COLUM. L.
REV. 241, n.3 (1968). In addition, see Davidson, Practical Considerations in Program
Patentability, COMPUTERS AND AUTOMATION, May 1968, at 12; Bigelow, Legal Aspects of
Proprietary Software, DATAMATION, Oct. 1968, at 32; Comment, Adequate Legal Protection
For Computer Programs, 1968 UTAH L. REv. 369; Koller & Moshman, Patent Protection
for Computer Software: Implications For The Industry, 12 IDEA 1109 (1968); Comment,
Computer Programs and Proposed Revisions of the Patent and Copyright Laws, 81 HARv.
L. REV. 1541 (1968); Kayton, Should Computer Software Get Patent Protection?, CHEMICAL
ENGINEERING, Feb. 24, 1969, at 52; and Rackman & Popper, The Case For Patenting Software, ELECTRONICS, July 7, 1969, at 96.
7 The patent system in the United States is the result of the action of Congress
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there was no case law directly in point until Application of Prater8was
handed down by the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.)
on November 20, 1968. In the year and a half that has followed, three
more decisions 9 pertaining to computer programs have been handed
down by the C.C.P.A. While many issues remain to be considered and
decided and the metes and bounds of patent protection for computer
programs have by no means been rigidly established, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals has clearly decided that the patent system
will protect computer programs.
The following discussion will attempt to synthesize these four cases
to establish what the current law regarding the patentability of computer programs is, as well as to indicate a few of the unresolved issues.
THE PATENTABILITY OF PROGRAMS BEFORE

Prater

Of all the opinions' ° that were expressed as to whether or not
computer programs should be patentable and whether or not they are
patentable subject matter" under the current patent law, 12 the most
important to patent practitioners was that of the U.S. Patent Office,
since its opinion determined the immediate disposition of patent applications13 directed to programming inventions. The Office's opinion
was expressed in a set of Guidelines adopted on October 22, 1968.14
under the Constitutional provision of U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 8: "The Congress shall have
power . . . [t]o promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited
times to authors and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries." The patent law currently in force is found in 35 U.S.C. (1952) and the RULEs
OF PRACTIcE IN PATENT CASES, 37 C.F.R. (1969), promulgated by the Commissioner of
Patents in accordance with the authority granted to him in 35 U.S.C. § 6 (1952).
8 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A. 1968), opinion superseded, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
9 Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969); In re Wheeling, - F.2d (C.C.P.A. 1969), 162 U.S.P.Q. 588 (1969); and Application of Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395
(C.C.P.A. 1969).
10 Supra note 6.
11 Patentable subject matter is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952) as being "any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof...." Computer programs, as defined in note 3 supra would
seem to fit best in the statutory category of "process."
12 35 U.S.C. (1952) and RuLES OF PACTICE IN PATENT CASES, 37 C.F.R. (1969).
13 A person who desires to obtain a patent must file a patent application in the
Patent Office in accordance with 35 U.S.C. §§ 111, 112, 113 and 115 (1952). A patent application must include, inter alia, a specification. A specification comprises two parts, a disclosure of the invention and one or more claims defining the invention. The disclosure
must be a complete description of the invention that is sufficient to allow anyone having
ordinary skill in the art to which it pertains to make and use it. The claims are a series
of numbered paragraphs immediately following the description of the invention that
serve, like the metes and bounds of a deed, to define the subject matter.
14 33 Fed. Reg. 15609 (1968), rescinded, 34 Fed. Reg. 15724 (1969).
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These Guidelines, after an introductory paragraph indicating that
they were based on only a tentative analysis of the applicable statutory
law and judicial precedent, set forth two propositions of law:
15

(1) Mental processes may not be patented, for which In re Abrams
was cited as authority; and
(2) Processes, to be patentable, must be performed on physical materials, for which Application of Shao Wen Yuan' 6 and Cochrane v. Deener17 were cited as authority.
From these two propositions the Guidelines determined

that a computer programming process which produces no
more than a numerical, statistical or other informational result
is a mental process and was not, per se, patentable but could
be part of a patentable invention 8 if combined with physical
steps that are performed on physical material.
The Guidelines were consistent with the Patent Office's interpretation of a series of cases' 9 dealing with the so-called "mental process"
or "mental step" doctrine. In essence, this doctrine, as interpreted by
the Patent Office, held that steps in a process claim 20 that could be
21
performed in the mind are not patentable.
The Patent Office explicitly applied its reasoning, as expressed in
15

188 F.2d 165 (C.C.P.A. 1951).

16 188 F.2d 377 (C.C.P.A. 1951).

94 U.S. 780 (1877).
18 The word "invention" is defined by 35 U.S.C. § 100 (1952) as an "invention or
discovery." In order to be patentable, an invention must be new and useful and fit into
one of the statutory classes set forth in 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1952), it must not be barred from
patentability by any of the provisions of 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1952), and it must not, in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1952), be obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art
to which it pertains.
19 See Nimtz, The Mental Step Doctrine As Developed in the Case Law, in SoFrWARE PROTECrION By TRADE SECRET, CONTRACr, PATENT 141 (1969), for an excellent summary
of the foundation of the mental step doctrine.
20 Process claims, also commonly termed method claims, are the particular type of
claims that are used to define inventions fitting into the statutory category of processes.
The elements of a method claim are always verb phrases that describe the manipulative
steps of the process. Process claims are contrasted with apparatus claims, used to define
inventions fitting into the statutory class of machines, and product claims, used to
define inventions fitting into the statutory classes of manufacture and composition of
matter.
21 This interpretation by the Patent Office did not meet with approval even prior
to the Prater decision of November 20, 1968. See Popper, Method Claims For Programmable Processes, in THE LAW OF SoFrwARE B-55 (1968), for a criticism of the Patent
Office's position, in particular the opinion at B-58 that narrowly construing Cochrane did
violence to its liberalizing stand in the development of patent law.
17
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the Guidelines, in two different ways to reject 22 claims drawn to
programming applications.
First, if computer programs are mental processes and mental
processes are nonstatutory subject matter under the provisions of 35
U.S.C. § 101, then computer programs are not patentable. Second,
even if computer programs are not mental processes, claims drafted to
computer programs read on23 mental processes, which are nonstatutory,
and hence such claims are rejected for failure to comply with the requirement 24 of "pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter
which the applicant regards as his invention."
The October 22, 1968, Guidelines did not mention the several
other bases for rejection of claims drawn to computer programs that
were commonly given 25 prior to the adoption of the Guidelines. One
of these was a rejection of all claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112 as being
based on an insufficient disclosure. The Patent Office was, in effect,
insisting that an enabling disclosure of the computer upon which the
proposed program was capable of running be included in the specification claiming the program. This view was in direct opposition to the
general viewpoint of programmers that a flow chart 26 is the best way of
concisely disclosing a computer program.
A second rejection commonly given 27 to claims in computer program applications is that since programmable computers are old, all
possible ways of programming them are either directly anticipated by
the computer itself, and thus barred by 35 U.S.C. § 102, or are obvious
from the structure of the machine and are thus barred by 35 U.S.C.

§ 103.
22 After a person seeking a patent has filed a patent application, as discussed in
note 13 supra, in the Patent Office, it is examined for patentability by an Examiner of
the Patent Office. If the application discloses and claims a patentable invention, and
contains no substantive or formal errors, a patent will be granted. If the application does
contain substantive or formal errors, or if the disclosed invention does not meet the
statutory standards for patentability, supra note 18, one or more of the claims will be
rejected by the Examiner. The Examiner's decision is communicated to the applicant
by means of a memorandum termed an "Official Action." See U.S. PAT. OFF., MANUAL OF
PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE, ch. 700 (3d ed. 1961).
23 The expression "The claim reads on this subject matter" is used by patent practitioners to indicate that the subject matter in question is included in the invention defined by the claim.
24 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1952).
25 See Nimtz, Computer Application and Claim Drafting Under Current Law, in
SOFTWARE PROTECTION BY TRADE SECRET, CONTRACT, PATENT 242, 248 (1969).
26 A "flow chart" is a graphical representation of an ordered sequence of steps that
must be executed by a digital computer in order to perform a particular function.
27 See Nimtz, supra note 25, at 248.
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A third rejection, 28 using similar reasoning, involves 35 U.S.C.
§ 112 as the ground for rejection. Programs involve, even under the
most liberal Patent Office viewpoint, at most a new use of an old machine. Any process claim directed to a programming invention which
did not call for a new use were rejected as failing to "particularly point
out and distinctly claim" the invention.
In summary then, prior to the Prater decision of November 20,
1968, any patent application that appeared to be directed to a computer
program was certain to receive one or more of the following rejections:
1. Claims directed toward computer programs are unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 because computer programs are mental processes
and mental processes are nonstatutory subject matter.
2. Claims directed toward computer programs either as processes
or special purpose digital computers are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102 because the subject matter of such claims is completely anticipated by general purpose digital computers.
3. Claims directed toward computer programs either as processes
or as special purpose digital computers are unpatentable under 35
U.S.C. § 103 because the subject matter of such claims is obvious in
view of general-purpose digital computers.
4. Claims directed toward a computer program are unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 112 because the disclosure is insufficient due to a lack
of an enabling disclosure of the computer upon which the program
is to run.
5. Claims directed toward a computer program are unpatentable
under 35 U.S.C. § 112 if they do not explicitly call for a new use of an
old machine.
6. If computer programs per se are not mental processes, claims
directed toward computer programs will of necessity read on mental
processes, which are not patentable, and hence fail to meet the requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112.
APPLICATION OF PRATER

The invention in this case was apparatus for and a method of
determining the relative proportions of various known constituent
gases in a mixture of gases through the use of a set of first order linear
equations derivable from a spectrogram. The spectrograms of such
gas mixtures typically include more peaks than there are constituent
28 Id. at 249.

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I:I113

gases and hence more equations than unknowns result. The essence
of the invention was the discovery that the particular subset of equations that had the largest determinant provided the most accurate solution.
No prior art 9 was cited by the examiner. The rejections were
based solely on considerations of law and statutory construction.
The applicants set forth in detail an electromechanical apparatus
capable of performing the invention. They also disclosed that a properly programmed digital computer could be used to perform their
novel process.
There were 11 method claims and one apparatus claim on appeal.
The examiner's rejections included those listed as numbers 1 and 6
in the above summary, with a citation to Abrams, as well as numbers
2 and 3. In addition, the examiner reasoned that if the applicants' apparatus claim did read on the analog embodiment that they disclosed,
it also read on a programmed digital computer on which they were
not entitled to coverage, and hence applicants had failed to distinctly
point out their invention as required by 35 U.S.C. § 112.
The Patent Office Board of Appeals affirmed the examiner's rejections. The board, citing Cochrane and Yuan, found that applicants'
claims could be performed mentally and did not therefore fall in a
statutory category.
The court first considered the process claims and the rejections
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 and § 102. The Abrams case, as well as the Don
Lee, Inc. v. Walker 0 and Halliburton Oil Well Cementing Co. v.
Walker 3 ' cases cited therein, was analyzed in great detail to determine
the origin of the mental step doctrine. Abrams involved a process
claim 32 involving the steps of, inter alia, "determining" and "comparing." The court carefully distinguished Abrams by pointing out
that Abrams did not disclose any means for performing these steps
and that digital computers suitable for performing them were not available at the time Abrams was decided. These steps, as far as Abrams'
teaching was concerned, could only be performed in the mind. In
contrast to this, the applicants in Prater had fully disclosed apparatus
for carrying out the steps of their claims without requiring that any
of them be performed in the mind.
The court then examined the reason that Abrams' claims had been
29 The term "prior art" is used by patent practitioners to refer to those categories of
subject matter that constitute bars to patentability under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1952).
30 61 F.2d 58 (9th Cir. 1932).
31 146 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1944).
32 188 F.2d at 165.
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rejected. The Abrams decision had expressly adopted88 the reasoning
of Halliburton. In Halliburton the statement had been made that
mental steps, even if novel, were not patentable.8 4 The decision of Don
Lee was cited as authority for this proposition. In analyzing Don Lee,
the court found3 5 dicta, unsupported by any precedent, indicating that
so-called "mental step" claims were unpatentable. Since the claim in
Don Lee was rejected on the basis of lack of novelty, the court in
Praterconcluded 6 that the mental step doctrine was not the result of
any holding of the case law. The court reached this conclusion without
either approving or disapproving the concept of the mental step doctrine.
At this point the court shifted to a discussion of the words "useful
arts" that appear in Article I, Section 8 of the U.S. Constitution. The
court discussed a series3 7 of cases that have interpreted these words and
showed that they have been construed in an increasingly broad fashion.
The court particularly pointed out8 8 the error in the Patent Office's
contention that Cochrane stands for the rule that all patentable processes must operate physically on substances. This contention is contrary to the intendment of the case which was not to limit process
patentability but to point out that a process is not limited to the means
used in performing it.
Next, the court considered 39 the 1952 Patent Act and found nothing therein, nor in the Act's legislative history, that tended to narrow
the statutory category of "process."
Their review of the U.S. Constitution, the case law, statutes, and
intent
of Congress led the court to the conclusion 40 that there was
the
no basis for denying patent protection to process claims merely because
they could alternatively be read on a mental process. Returning then
to the distinction between Abrams and Prater, the court explicitly
stated their holding:
This distinction from A brains leads us to our present holding
which is that patent protection for a process disclosed as being
a sequence or combination of steps, capable of performance with33
34
35
38

Id. at 170.
146 F.2d at 821.
415 F.2d at 1387.
Id.

Waxham v. Smith, 294 U.S. 20 (1935); Smith v. Snow, 294 U.S. 1 (1935); Telephone
Cases, 126 U.S. 1 (1888); Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U.S. 707 (1881); Cochrane v. Deener,
94 U.S. 780 (1877).
88 415 F.2d at 1387-88.
89 Id. at 1389.
40 Id.
87
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out human intervention and directed to an industrial technologya "useful art" within the intendment of the Constitution-is not
precluded by the mere fact that the process could alternatively be
41
carried out by mental steps.
The court then reversed the rejection of the process claims under
35 U.S.C. § 101 and § 102 and the rejection of the process claims under
35 U.S.C. § 101 and § 112. The same reasoning was held 42 to apply to
the rejection of the single apparatus claim and that rejection was also
reversed.
Although the court's holding in Prater was clearly and explicitly
stated, it was almost immediately misconstrued. The case was hailed in
the technical press 43 as standing for both the patentability of computer
programs and for the patentability of mental processes.
In view of the misconstruction of patent law that this case generated, it is as important to emphasize what the case did not hold as
well as what it did hold. In the first place it most emphatically did
not hold that mental processes are patentable. Neither did it hold that
mental processes are not patentable. The case made no statements directly concerning the patentability of mental steps. The sum total of
the court's decision insofar as mental steps are concerned is that there
is no basis in law for holding a claim that reads on statutory subject
matter unpatentable merely because it alternatively reads on mental
steps.
The general statement that the case holds that computer programs are patentable is also inaccurate. The court's holding was only
applicable to processes directed to an "industrial technology. '44 Obviously the court considered the process in Prater to be directed toward an industrial technology, but the case certainly is not definitive
of the meaning of these words. This decision, then, left room for later
decisions broad enough to allow the patenting of any new, useful, and
nonobvious program or narrow enough to follow the Patent Office
Guidelines 45 and deny the patenting of a computer program that produces no more than a numerical, statistical or other informational
result. This distinction is extremely important since the bulk of presId.
Id.
43 See, e.g., Software Patent Future Murky Despite Recent Court Decision, DATAMATION, Jan. 1969, at 78. This short newsbrief contained the statement, referring to Prater,
that the "court ruled that 'mental processes' may be patentable." But see Praternity
(Letter to the Editor), DATAMATION, Mar. 1969, at 13.
44 415 F.2d at 1389.
45 Supra note 14.
41

42
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ent-day programming, as well as that of the foreseeable future, is directed toward producing numerical, statistical or other informational
results.

46

Unsatisfied with the decision in Prater, the Patent Office requested a rehearing, 47 submitting a petition that expressed the fear
that Prater gave to a patentee ".

.

. the right to exclude others from

thinking in a certain manner." 4 Reaching dramatic heights rarely
found in a legal brief,49 the Patent Office requested the court to reconsider its "landmark" opinion. 0 The rehearing was granted 5' by a
three to two margin over the forceful dissent of Judge Rich. The result of the rehearing (hereinafter referred to as the second Prater decision) was a decision 52 that superseded the first Praterdecision, and
that affirmed the Board of Appeals' decision rejecting all of the process claims and reversed the board's decision rejecting the apparatus
claim. Although the result of the rehearing was different from the result of the first Prater decision, the holding of the first decision was
not actually overruled. Instead, the court decided that it was not necessary to go as far as the holding in the first Praterdue to the admissions of the parties at the oral hearing.
The court, after discussing the appellants' invention and the rejections in the same manner as was done in the first Prater decision,
took a critical look at the arguments that the appellants had presented.
Appellants had not sought to have the issue of the patentability of
mental steps, per se, decided. They merely sought to distinguish their
case from cases involving mental steps. The thrust of their argument
had been that they had disclosed nonmental steps for performing their
process and that their claims, read in light of their disclosure, did not
read on mental processes.53 The Patent Office, on the other hand, had
conceded 54 that appellants had disclosed a statutory invention but argued that the claims were too broad because they encompassed nonstatutory subject matter.
46 See McGovern, User Software Economics, in

THE LAW OF SOFTWARE 1969 PRO-

Cr.EINGS L-1 at L-3.

47 C.C.PA. R. 7.
48 Petition For Rehearing at 8, Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (1968).
49 "A free people could not have delegated to Congress any power to control personal thought, directly or otherwise. Orwell's '1984' was not to be our destiny, although
such might come to pass if the judiciary is not vigilant." Id.
50 Petition For Rehearing at 13, Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1378 (C.C.P.A.
1968).
51 Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1390 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
52 Application of Prater, 415 F.2d 1393 (C.C.P.A. 1969).
53 Id. at 1401, n.21.
54 Id. at 1400, n.19.
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The court then summarized the analysis that had been made of
Abrams in the first Prater decision and noted" that such a detailed
analysis was not required to decide the Prater case. In the course of
this discussion the court cited the language of Yuan indicating that
purely mental steps are unpatentable and defined 56 "purely mental
steps" as being those which may only be performed in, or with the
aid of, the human mind. The court then made the important statement: 57 "Whether or not a sequence of purely mental steps comes
within the bounds of 'process' as used in 35 U.S.C. §§ 100 and 101
is, we feel, an issue which has never been squarely decided."
The court concluded that the Prater case was not controlled by
Abrams, Yuan, or Cochrane because appellants' disclosure did not
require the use of a purely mental step. However, even though appellants' disclosed process did not fall within the so-called mental step
doctrine, the issue was really as to the limitations of their claimed
process. 58 Appellants' original brief had admitted5 9 that their process
claims, read apart from their disclosure, were broad enough to cover
a person working with a pencil. Further, appellants had stated that
they did not wish coverage of any purely mental process or any mental process coupled only with pencil and paper markings. The court
then reasoned 6 that the appellants were, in effect, requesting the
court to read certain limitations into their process claims; limitations
which were not based on the actual language of the claims. This request was interpreted by the court as an admission by the appellants
that their process claims were too broad.
The court therefore rejected all of appellants' process claims under
35 U.S.C. § 112 for their failure to particularly point out and dis55 Id. at 1401.
56 Id. at 1402, n.22.
57 Id. at 1402, n.23.
58 As discussed supra note 13, it is the claims that comprise the exact legal description
of the invention. Regardless of what a patentee has disclosed in his specification, his
patent protection consists only of what his claims cover. Hence the claims of a patent
application must, in accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1952), distinctly point out the
invention.
59 415 F.2d at 1404.
60 Nevertheless, "reading a claim in the light of the specification," to thereby
interpret limitations explicitly recited in the claim, is a quite different thing from
"reading limitations of the specification into a claim," to thereby narrow the
scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations which have no ex-.
press basis in the claim. This distinction is difficult to draw and is often confused
by courts; but it is even more difficult for attorneys, attempting to work within
the framework of the former, not to cross over into the latter.
In our view, appellants would really like us to read a limitation of the
specification into the claims, not merely interpret the claims in the light of the
specification. Id.
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tinctly claim the subject matter that appellants regarded as their invention.
This problem did not arise, the court found, in regard to appellants' apparatus claim. The apparatus claim did not involve any mental step issues and had been rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based on
the reasoning of rejection number 3 in the above list. The court
held 61 this reasoning fatally defective for the simple reason that, even
though general-purpose digital computers and typical programming
techniques were in existence at the time of appellants' invention, their
apparatus claim was not obvious because, without appellants' teaching, one of ordinary skill in the art would not know what to program
the computer to do.
The court's holdings in the second Prater decision may be summarized as follows. In regard to the process claims, the court held that
claims that read on subject matter that an applicant does not regard
as his invention are unpatentable under 35 U.S.C. § 112 for failure
to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject matter which
the applicant regards as his invention. In regard to the apparatus claim,
the court held that the mere existence of a general-purpose digital
computer does not render obvious all apparatus claims that can be
read on such a computer.
Since the second Prater decision superseded the first one, the
holding in the first case, although not overruled, cannot be said to
be a valid proposition of the case law. The first holding of the second
Prater case does not apply specifically to the field of computer programming while the second holding is really a very small step and is,
in fact, nothing of a surprise in view of the fact that, since a generalpurpose digital computer can perform the same function as almost
every possible digital circuit, a converse holding would forever bar
patent protection to this important class of inventions as well as invalidate a large number of existing patents.
What, then, is there of value to the patent practitioner in the two
Pratercases? It is submitted that dicta in these two cases indicate how
patent applications, particularly the claims, may best be formulated
to insure approval by the C.C.P.A., assuming, of course, that the invention is new, useful, and not obvious to one of ordinary skill in
the art. Some of the Praterdicta, particularly footnote 2962 of the sec61

Id. at 1406.

62 No reason is now apparent to us why, based on the Constitution, statute, or

case law, apparatus and process claims broad enough to encompass the operation
of a programmed general-purpose digital computer are necessarily unpatentable.
In one sense, a general-purpose digital computer may be regarded as but a store-

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 1:113

ond Praterdecision, has already been transformed into law by a later
case,6 3 and therefore further discussions of the probable effect of the
Praterdicta will be deferred pending the summaries of the two cases
that remain to be considered.
In re

WHEELING

The invention in this case involved a process for optimizing the
operation of a chemical plant, a refinery, or the like where such parameters as temperatures, pressures, feed rates and feed quality can
be varied. The essence of the optimization involved the changing of
each of the variables repetitively in a random manner initially and
thereafter making the changes less random depending upon past performance.
The court discussed the invention, 64 the examiner's position,65
the board's opinion, 66 the solicitor's position,"T and the appellant's
position 8 in detail. It then held 69 that the statutory provisions upon
which the claims had been rejected had not been set forth with sufficient clarity to permit a proper determination of the legal issues and
remanded the case for clarification. Hence, although the invention in
this case appears to involve a computer program, it adds nothing to
the law of software patentability.
APPLICATION OF BERNHART

The invention in this case was disclosed as a method of and apparatus for automatically making a two-dimensional portrayal of a
three-dimensional object from any desired angle and distance and on
any desired plane of projection. The apparatus comprised a generalroom of parts and/or electrical components. But once a program has been introduced, the general-purpose digital computer becomes a special-purpose digital
computer (i.e., a specific electrical circuit with or without electro-mechanical components) which, along with the process by which it operates, may be patented
subject, of course, to the requirements of novelty, utility, and non-obviousness.
Based on the present law, we see no other reasonable conclusion.
Id. at 1403.
63 Application of Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395 (C.C.P.A. 1969), discussed infra in text.
64 162 U.S.P.Q. at 589.
65 Id. at 590.
66 Id. at 592.
67 Id. at 593.
68
69

Id. at 594.
Id.
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purpose digital computer coupled to a plotting machine. The method
comprised the use of allegedly novel equations definitive of the geometric relationships between the three-dimensional coordinates of each
point of interest and the corresponding two-dimensional points of interest.
The examiner rejected 70 all of the appealed claims under 35
U.S.C. § 112 as based on insufficient disclosure since the applicants
had merely set forth equations without including a computer program. This rejection was reversed 7' by the board for the reason that,
given applicants' equations, the required computer program would
be obvious to those skilled in programming.
The examiner further rejected the applicants' apparatus claim
under 35 U.S.C. § 101, citing a reference showing that it was old in
the art to connect a computer and a plotting machine and stating that
applicants' novelty lay in the disclosed equations which did not constitute a structural difference over the prior art. Applicants' method
claim was rejected for reason number 1. The board affirmed these
rejections reasoning that the issues involved in the apparatus claims
72
were analogous to the "printed matter" cases.
The court first considered the apparatus claims. Applicants' apparatus claims involved conventional means plus function language
including "electronic digital signal processing means," "planar illustration means," and "electronic digital computer means." Appropriate
antecedents for this language were found in applicants' disclosure of
digital computers and mechanical drafting machines. The court found
no recitation of mental steps in the claim language holding 73 that, in
accordance with 35 U.S.C. § 112, means-plus-function74 language would
be construed to cover the corresponding structure, material, or acts
described in the specification and equivalents thereof, but that a human being could not be construed as being the equivalent of a machine' disclosed in a patent application. The court also held 75 that the
70

Application of Bernhart, 417 F.2d 1395, 1398 (C.C.P.A. 1969).

71 Id.
72 Id. These cases, exemplified by the case cited by the board, Ex parte Gwinn, 112
U.S.P.Q. 439 (P.O. Bd. App. 1955), dealt with claims defining as the invention certain
novel arrangements of printed lines or characters useful and intelligible only to the
human mind.
73 Id. at 1399.
74 This term refers to the provision in 35 U.S.C. § 112 (1952) for expressing an
element in a claim for a combination as a means or a step for performing a specified
function without the recital of structure, material, or acts in support thereof.
75 417 F.2d at 1399.
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"printed matter" cases had no factual relevance to applicants' inven
tion.
The court next considered the examiner's reasoning that since
the novel part of the invention was indicated by an equation, and
since equations do not fit into a statutory class, the invention was nonstatutory. The court rejected this reasoning and struck down the implication that applicants were trying to patent mathematical principles
by carefully pointing out that it is not the equations that are being
claimed, but the machine that operates in accordance with the equations. 76 The court recognized that mathematics is the language of science and as such can often be used as the most concise way of describing
the operation of a machine. Further, since 35 U.S.C. § 103 provides
that patentability shall not be negatived by the manner in which the
invention was made, the inventor who mathematically discovers new
and unobvious principles which he then embodies in a machine must
get the same patent protection as he would if he had invented the
machine directly by a process of trial and error.
This careful distinction between patenting equations and patenting the machine defined by the equations is important in that it lays
to rest an emotional reaction to the patenting of computer programs.
This important step forward was followed in the next paragraph by
an even greater step.
Dicta77 in the second Prater decision indicated that the court
knew of no reason why apparatus claims broad enough to encompass
the operation of a programmed general-purpose digital computer
would be necessarily unpatentable. In Bernhart the court fulfilled
the promise of this dicta by holding, "We are concluding here that
such machines are statutory under 35 U.S.C. § 101, and that claims
defining them must be judged for patentability in light of the prior
art."78s Since this says that a novel, useful, and unobvious program
can convert a well-known digital computer into a patentable machine,
the court thus granted patent protection in the form of apparatus
claims to computer programs.
76 Moreover, all machines function according to laws of physics which can be
mathematically set forth if known. We cannot deny patents on machines merely
because their novelty may be explained in terms of such laws if we are to obey
the mandate of Congress that a machine is subject matter for a patent. We should
not penalize the inventor who makes his invention by discovering new and unobvious mathematical relationships which he then utilizes in a machine, as against
the inventor who makes the same machine by trial and error and does not disclose
the laws by which it operates.
Id. at 1399-1400.
77 See note 62 supra.
78 417 F.2d at 1400.
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The court's reasoning in reaching this decision is extremely inter
esting since it goes further than even most proponents of patent pro'
tection for computer programs had foreseen. The idea had been
expressed 79 that the four-dimensional machine, the fourth dimension
being time, that existed solely during the execution of a novel and
unobvious program on a general-purpose digital computer, was patentable. The court went further than this in that they held that the
three-dimensional machine that results from storing a novel and unobvious program in the core memory of a computer is structurally
different from the same machine without that program since its mem
ory elements are differently arranged. This structural difference actually comprises a difference in the direction of the magnetism existing
in the multitude of tiny magnetic cores8" comprising the computer's
memory unit. The court stated that "[t]he fact that these physical
changes are invisible to the eye should not tempt us to conclude that
the machine has not been changed." 81
Turning to applicants' method claim, the court again refused to
construe conventional language such as "digital computer" and "planar
plotting apparatus" to cover a human being, again finding no mental
step issues. However, it appears that the mental step issue actually
was present in view of the form of the steps in the method claim. In
the second Pratercase the court, in dicta, said82 that although the applicants there had disclosed a "machine-implemented process" they
had not claimed it as such. Rather, their method claims had required
the steps, inter alia, of "dividing," "generating" and "comparing,"
each of which, the court held, did read on a non-machine implementation. The first two steps of the method claim in Bernhart require
"programming the computer to compute ..

."83 While "dividing,"

"generating," and "comparing" are steps reading on both machine and
non-machine steps, the step of "programming" a computer reads solely
upon a human act requiring mental steps. The court did find the
method claim in Bernhart to be unpatentable but did so because they
found it to be obvious in light of the prior art. It is submitted that
the claim, in this form, did require mental steps and that therefore
79 See Eltgroth, Software and the Patent Law, in 1966 PATENT LAW ANNUAL 1.

80 A magnetic core is a doughnut-shaped piece of magnetic material having two states
of polarization, thereby being capable of storing one binary digit of information. The
polarization of a core may be changed by pulses of electrical current carried on wires that
run through the center of the core.
81 417 F.2d at 1400.
82 415 F.2d at 1404.
8 417 F.2d at 1397.
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the mental step issue was squarely raised and should have been decided.
Since the court said in regard to the method claim that ". . . we find
that it in no way covers any mental steps . . . ,,s4 it cannot be said

that the mental step issue was implicitly decided by the court's conclusion that the claim was statutory.
Finally, the court applied the cited prior art to the apparatus
claims and found them to be patentable over it. The prior art had
disclosed the combination of a computer and a plotting machine. The
claims of Bernhart distinguished over the prior art solely in the provision of a new way to perform the data transformations. The court
stated 5 "[w]e believe . ..the new programming claimed, does make
the invention as a whole unobvious."
CONCLUSIONS

In' view of the foregoing four cases, what is the law concerning
the patentability of computer programs? First, the six rejections which
were commonly given to computer program applications are clearly
invalid. While the court has not as yet decided whether purely mental
processes are nonstatutory subject matter, rejection 1 is invalid because of the court's reasoning that computer programs effect structural
changes in the machines upon which they are run. Rejections 2 and 3
were struck down by the court's statement"6 that general-purpose digital computers, programmed in a novel and unobvious way, are statutory machines that must be judged for patentability in light of the
prior art. Additional support was given toward laying rejection 4 to
87
rest in the court's citation, with approval, of Application of Naquin.
84 Id. at 1401.
85 Id. at 1401-02.
86 Id. at 1400.
87 398 F.2d 863 (C.C.P.A. 1968). This case involved a method of underground surveying in which seismic signals are generated at several points on the earth's surface,
travel into the earth, and are reflected by underground formations back to the surface
where they can be detected and measured. The method involved the use of a digital
computer. Appellant did not disclose how a digital computer could be programmed to
perform the calculations required in the method, but merely contended that a person
of ordinary skill in the art of programming would know how to do the programming
required by the method. The court held:
The specification need describe the invention only in such detail as to
enable a person skilled in the most relevant art to make and use it. When an
invention, in its different aspects, involves distinct arts, that specification is
adequate which enables the adepts of each art, those who have the best chance
of being enabled, to carry out the aspect proper to their specialty.
Id.at 866.
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Rejection 5, which was actually directed more toward an issue of form
rather than substance, was implicitly overturned by the court's statement 8s that "[i]f a new machine has not been invented, certainly a 'new
and useful improvement' of the unprogrammed machine has been . . ."
coupled with their explicit approval 9 of Bernhart's claim 19.90 Finally,
by approving of the form of Bernhart'smethod claim, the court has implicitly held that claims directed toward computer programs need not,
of necessity, read on mental processes, thereby disapproving of rejection 6.
In addition to overcoming these six rejections, it is submitted that
the court's opinion in Bernhart has established the following propositions of law.
1. Each different program that is placed in the core memory of
a general-purpose digital computer represents a structural change resulting in a machine that is different from the unprogrammed computer.
2. The mere existence of programming techniques and generalpurpose digital computers does not make all such possible structural
changes obvious.
3. The machines resulting from such a structural change comprise statutory subject matter.
4. These machines may be described in the specification and
claimed by using the appropriate mathematical relationships without
the inclusion of a complete program listing.
5. The placing of a novel, useful and nonobvious program in the
memory of a digital computer renders the resulting structure patentable.
These propositions clearly show that patent protection may now
be obtained for computer programs. This fact established, the next
question of interest to the patent practitioner is how he can draft a
disclosure and a set of claims that will adequately protect his client's
programming inventions and will be most clearly within the scope of
the court's approval.
Considering first the question as to the disclosure, it is noted that
88

417 F.2d at 1400.

89 Id. at 1402.
90 Id. at 1397-98. This claim was drafted in typical apparatus claim format and called
for "electronic digital computer means programmed to .... " The court's approval of this
language is in accordance with their holding that programming a computer results in a
structural change, as discussed infra in text.
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three elements are generally regarded 9' as providing an exhaustive
description of a programming invention: a written description of the
novel process, including a reference to one or more suitable generalpurpose computers upon which the process can be performed; a flow
chart detailing the steps of the novel process; and a listing of a program suitable for performing the process. The court's approval of
Naquin in Bernhart92 suggests that the last element, a program listing,
is superfluous.98 HoWever, in view of the prohibition of the addition
of new matter 94 to a specification after it has been filed, a listing should
probably be included to insure against a 35 U.S.C. § 112 rejection.
The listing can always be deleted from the specification during the
prosecution of the application if it is later deemed advisable to do so.
Considering next the question of claim formats, it should first be
noted that, since special-purpose apparatus can always be designed to
perform any function that can be performed by a programmed generalpurpose digital computer,9 5 both method and apparatus claims should
be used to insure adequate protection of the invention. While the doctrine of equivalents 8 probably would allow apparatus claims drafted
to a programmed general-purpose digital computer to cover such special-purpose apparatus, protection can be assured through the additional use of method claims, which, if properly drafted, will cover all
apparatus which can be used to practice the invention. In view of the
holding97 in Bernhart and the dicta in both the Bernhart and the second Pratercases, it appears reasonable to make some definite recommendations as to suitable claim formats. The following suggested claim
formats are presumed to be drawn to inventions involving a new, useful, and nonobvious process suitable for being practiced on a digital
computer.
Dealing first with method claims, it can be noted that although
none of the above-analyzed cases actually allowed a method claim, the
91 See Kurtz, Examples of Inventions Embodying Software, Types of Disclosures and
in SOFrwAR PROTECIION BY TRADE SEcRET, CONTRACT, PATENT 160 (1969).

Claims

417 F.2d at 1398.
93 See Kayton, Patent Protectability of Software: Background and Current Law, in
THE LAW OF SOFTWARE 1968 PROCEEDINGS at B-50.
94 35 U.S.C. § 132 (1952).
95 See Popper, From Hardware to Software: An Adventure Having Some Surprises,
92

in SOFTWARE PROTECTION BY TRADE SECRET, CONTRACT, PATENT 99 (1969).

96 The doctrine of equivalents arose in the case law due to the necessity of determining, in particular cases, whether a particular apparatus or method infringed a valid
patent. in essence, the doctrine states that no one can borrow the substance of a patented
invention by making immaterial variations. See generally Pugh, The Doctrine of Equivalents-Asset or Liability to the Drafter of Claims?, 43 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 614 (1961).
97 See discussion of Bernhart in text.
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form that such claims should take is clearly indicated, The court in
Bernhart approved of the form of the sole method claim in that case,
however, as previously discussed, 98 that particular form appears to be
subject to the argument that it covers mental steps. Since the question
of the patentability of mental steps has not yet been decided and since
such coverage will probably not be desired by a client,99 the patent
practitioner's objective is to draft method claims that clearly exclude
mental steps and thus do not raise the issue as to their patentability.
Turning, then, to the dicta in the second Prater decision, it appears
that the court went out of its way to suggest suitable method claim
elements. The court pointed out'0 0 that although the appellants in
Prater had disclosed a "machine-implemented process," they had not
limited their claims to a "machine process" or a "machine-implemented process." This language seems to clearly point to the following format:
The machine implemented process of [performing a specified
function] comprising the steps of:
machine [determining a specified quantity];
machine [computing a specified quantity];
machine [comparing specified quantities];

machine [generating a specified quantity].
The exact language placed in the bracketed portions of the claim
would, of course, depend upon the nature of the particular invention.
The use of the modifying word "machine" in front of the steps of
"determining," "comparing," etc. should overcome the court's statement' 0 1 in the second Prater decision that these latter words do read
on a mental process augmented by pencil and paper markings. Support
for this supposition is found in the following language of Bernhart:
To find that the claimed process could be done mentally
would require us to hold that a human mind is a digital computer or its equivalent, and that a draftsman is a planar plotting
apparatus or its equivalent. On the facts of this case we are un2
willing so to hold. 10
98 Id.

99 The program processes for which a client will be seeking patent protection will
generally be of such a nature as to make it literally impossible for a human being to
practice them by using only his mind and a pencil and paper.
100 415 F.2d at 1404.
101 Id.
102 417 F.2d at 1401.
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In view of this it appears doubtful that the court would ever hold
.that the human mind is a "machine" as that term is used in the patent
law. On the other hand, the term is broad enough in scope to cover all
types of apparatus that could be used to practice the method.
Dealing next with apparatus claims, the following generalized
form of claim 19103 of Bernhartshould be allowable based on the court's
discussion in Bernhart:
A system for [performing a particular function] comprising in
combination: electronic digital computer means programmed to [perform a particular step] according to the relationship [descriptive equation]; means coupled with said computer to [perform a particular
function]; .. .and means coupled with said computer to [perform a
particular function]. Again, the exact language placed in the bracketed
portions of this claim depends upon the nature of the particular invention being claimed.
While this claim covers a programmed general-purpose electronic
digital computer it is of narrow scope due to the explicit recital of
"electronic digital computer means." In attempting to broaden this
claim, it is profitable to consider the holding in the second Praterdecision with respect to appellants' claim 10: "We do not perceive any
'mental steps' issue in regard to apparatus claim 10. It is quite clear
that claim 10, in typical means-plus-function language as expressly permitted by the third paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112, does not encompass
the human being as the 'means' or any part thereof."' 10 4 It must be
remembered that appellants in Prater disclosed in detail an electromechanical apparatus, but only briefly mentioned'0 5 the alternate use
of a digital computer. However, Bernhart expressly supported and approved the above-quoted language, and Bernhart did disclose a digital
computer as the primary means of practicing the invention. This fact,
coupled with the holding in Bernhart that placing a program into the
core memory of a computer results in a structural change, indicates
that this resulting structure should be claimable in means-plus-function
language, where each means clause in the claim has as its basis a particular portion of the programmed core memory. That is, apparatus
claims could be drafted in the following manner to cover the structure
of a programmed general-purpose computer:
Apparatus [for performing a specified function] comprising:
103
104

Id. at 1397-98.
415 F.2d at 1406.

105 Id. at 1397, n.18.
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means [for performing a specified subfunction];

means [for performing a specified subfunction].
The modification of the word "means" in the above claim by the
word "machine," as was done in the suggested method claims, should
not be necessary in view of the court's statements regarding apparatus
claims. The use of the above claim format requires the use of descriptive flow charts to meet the formal requirements of Patent Office Rule
83.106 Since a flow chart 10 7 is comprised of graphical drawing symbols
representative of the programmed core memory portions required to
practice the invention, including the flow charts in the drawing will
show every feature of the invention specified in the claims.
A final point to be considered is whether or not the court will narrow its holding in Bernhart. It is conceivable that the function performed by a program will become an issue in a later case. For example,
supposing a new, useful, and unobvious program was developed for
analyzing market study data and specifying business decisions such as
amount of inventory, plant and capital expansion. There is nothing
in Bernhart to prevent a patent being granted on the structure resulting from placing this program in the core memory of a digital
computer. However, it appears that granting such a patent would
directly conflict with the hallowed hornbook law statement that plans
for doing business are not patentable. 10 8 Alternatively, consider a program whose sole function is the performance of a numerical operation
(such as taking the square root of a number) in a new, useful, nonobvious and highly efficient manner. This program would be very useful in a computation center in which numerical calculations are repetitively performed. Will the court, when faced with a situation such as
this, retreat to the holding of the first Pratercase and declare that such
programs are not directed toward an industrial technology? Or will
they perhaps declare that data processing is an industrial technology
and grant a patent? It is clear that the general-purpose digital computer, which has proven capable of being used to solve problems in
many fields, has created a multitude of problems in the field of patent
law, many of which remain to be solved.
George A. Heitczman
37 C.F.R. § 1.83 (1969).
107 See definition in note 26 supra.
106

108 See A. SMITH, PATENT LAw CASFS, COMMNIENTrS AND NIATERIALs 65 (1964).

